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The form of contract plays a significant role in the
governance of relationships between parties. Recent
research in project procurement emphasises
relationships and cultural/behavioural issues. Such
relationships operate within a formal (contractual)
framework as well as an informal (interpersonal/social)
framework since no contract is entirely transactional or
entirely relational in nature. Sir Michael Latham
suggested a cultural/behavioural change is required in
the construction industry such that project participants
should embrace a ‘modern contract’. This paper
examines the 13 Latham requirements of a modern
contract in the latest edition of the NEC. The
requirements are categorised, under what are labelled
here as pillars of a modern contract, namely ‘fairness’,
‘roles and functions of project participants’, and
‘payment operating mechanisms’. Developments in
contracting practices in the Chinese construction
industry, with a cultural tradition grounded in Confucian
values of cooperation and sharing, are then examined
and juxtaposed against the UK construction industry’s
movement towards a modern contract rooted in
relational contracting. The developments show that
China has nurtured a change towards the more formal,
contractual, system of rights and obligations in their
‘modernisation’ of construction procurement in sharp
contrast to the UK movement towards greater
collaboration and cooperation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Construction projects in many countries are largely procured
using standard forms of contract prepared by various drafting
bodies. The placing and management of contracts have been
the subject of research over many years. Recent research
emphasises relationships and cultural/behavioural issues in
project teams. Such relationships operate within a formal
(contractual) framework as well as an informal (interpersonal/
social) framework. Many government reports concerning the
UK construction industry over the last 70 years have focused
on the management of contracts with various suggestions
and comments calling for culture change away from
adversarial relationships towards cohesive, integrated teams
requiring collaboration between project team members
(Murray and Langford, 2003). In other countries, such as
China (where a tradition of collectivism and collaboration
dominates) and Japan (where participative management and
partnering/alliancing flourish in their construction and
manufacturing sectors), the importance of relationship
management (within the formal, contractual system and the
informal, social system) is paramount to the success of
construction projects.
The mechanism of the contract can play a significant role in
the formation of relationships within the context of
contractual roles (formal system) and cultural/social norms
(informal system). Three elements are proposed here as pillars
of a contract that suit the modern world of construction (a
modern contract): ‘fairness’, ‘roles and functions of project
participants’ and ‘payment operating mechanisms’. A
theoretical foundation is first advanced in support of the
three constructs as pillars of a modern contract. The NEC3
family of contracts (ICE, 2005) as an exemplary modern
contract is then examined against these three pillars to
ascertain conformance. Finally, developments in contracting
practices within the Chinese construction industry are
juxtaposed against those of the UK to show how the two
industries have been moving in completely opposite
directions along the transactional–relational continuum of
contract systems. Given the growing influence of China in the
global economy and the growing influence of Chinese
contractors worldwide, this comparison is both relevant and
timely.
2. THE THREE PILLARS OF A MODERN CONTRACT
Contracts are a common feature in construction projects. The
construction contracting process is a typical manifestation of
a principal–agent scenario in which the client (the principal)
often engages the services of a contractor (the agent) to
deliver a product or a service. Contracts are therefore used to
outline duties and responsibilities, specify tasks to be
performed, set out rules for determining compensation and
laying down how actions of the parties may be monitored.
Traditionally, contracting practices have taken a transactional
approach characterised by discrete, economic exchange
conducted in a formal manner and only engaging small
segments of personal beings of the participants (Macneil,
1974). The consequences of such an approach have been
adversarial attitudes prone to conflict as parties to such
transactions adopt exclusively self-seeking postures as they
see themselves engaged in zero-sum games (Walker and
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Davis, 1999). In contrast to the traditional transactional
approach to contracting, a relational approach to contracting
has been advocated and promoted over the past decades
embracing various collaborative working practices such as
partnering, alliancing and supply chain management. Such
approaches are characterised by ‘long-term social exchange
between parties, mutual trust, interpersonal attachment,
commitment to specific partners, altruism and cooperative
problem solving’ (Duberley, 1997). Within the context of
construction contracting practice, transactional and relational
contracts differ in several respects; transactional dependence,
nature of the procedures for work ordering, degree of
documentation, resolution of contingency, length of trading
agreement and nature of risk sharing (Macneil, 1974; Walker
and Davis, 1999).
In reality, no contract is likely to be entirely transactional or
entirely relational in nature (Floricel and Lampel, 1998;
Walker and Davis, 1999). Indeed, a study by Walker and
Davis (1999) found broad agreement between clients and
contractors on the need for contracts to contain both
transactional and relational elements. Aspects of relational
contracts that promote cooperation and communication
among parties were preferred while transactional aspects of
contracts that promote clear initial specification of the
contract with its attendant duties, obligations and
expectations were also preferred. A contingency approach
may therefore often be necessary through which a typology
of contractual types may emerge along the transactional-
relational continuum.
From the foregoing therefore, what constitutes a modern
contract may therefore not be one that is entirely relational in
nature. The view here is that there is a normative context in
relation to contracting and that these norms define the
boundaries for social behaviour – what is right, adequate,
acceptable and just (Anvuur, 2008). Ten common contract
behavioural patterns and norms were identified as necessary
in providing the normative context in contracts: role
integrity; reciprocity; implementation of planning;
effectuation of consent; flexibility; contractual solidarity;
restitution, reliance and expectation interests; creation and
restraint of power; propriety of means; and harmonisation
(Macneil, 1983). Building on the work of Macneil (1983) on
creating a normative context in contracts, we propose three
pillars as key to the development of a modern contract within
the construction contracting practice context: ‘fairness’, ‘roles
and functions of project participants’ and ‘payment operating
mechanisms’.
2.1. Fairness
The concept of fairness, which underpins the parties’ trusting
behaviours, is often complicated by project complexity,
uncertainty, and inter-organisational communication which
together can influence collaborative behaviour. Kadefors
(2005) investigated the norms and strategies in project
organisations, focusing on the perceived fairness in inter-
organisational project relations and concluded that, ‘an
intuitive cost-based norm of fair pricing shapes interaction in
construction projects, but that consequences vary between
projects’. These include reduction in effectiveness of risk
management which can subsequently lead to client distrust if
the cost-based norm favours contractors. The tendency then
is to design procurement practices and communication
methods to counteract perceived losses.
Gouldner (1960) has long argued that a norm of reciprocity is
a vital stabilising factor that exists in human society, hence
individuals who experience unfairness tend to react with
strong emotions. The consequences of perceived injustice
include loss of trust, loyalty, and motivation. To mitigate
against such negative outcomes the literature on
organisational management emphasises that decision-makers
and decision processes need to be fair. The simplest norm for
distribution of outcomes is equality – rewards to be
distributed in proportion to investments, costs and merit
(Kadefors, 2005). This leads to the principle of risk allocation.
It is, however, complicated to distribute reward according to
the principles of equity; often, it is simpler to use an equality
norm (see Grandori and Neri, 1999 who agree that
asymmetric allocation requires more justification, discussion,
calculation and bargaining than more egalitarian ones).
Equality-based solutions are easier to administer and justify
although the concept of fairness is related to equitable
treatment (rather than merely treated equally).
Interactional justice is also important in the operation of a
construction contract because an individual’s judgement of
fairness does not depend on distributive justice alone but also
on the processes in deciding outcomes (see Grandori and Neri,
1999). The implications of perceived fairness based on norms
are discussed in further detail through case studies concluding
that ‘it is hard to develop shared perceptions of fairness’
(Kadefors, 2005). Fairness can however manifest through the
risk allocation profile adopted in the contract. Individuals
tend to be risk averse when evaluating possible gains but risk
seeking in mitigating losses. A sense of teamwork should
therefore be promoted based on relational contracting which
promotes a recognition of mutual benefits and win–win
scenarios through collaborative working arrangement and
better risk sharing mechanisms (Alsagoff and McDermott,
1994). The importance of social guidelines (Macaulay, 1963)
is emphasised in relational contracting where the norms may
take precedence over legal mechanisms offered by specific
contracts. The risk allocation at the outset of a contract may
give rise to opportunism which results in potential actions
that may benefit one party at the expense of others (Lyons
and Mehta, 1997), but according to Rahman and
Kumaraswamy (2002) the risk of exploitative opportunism
may be safeguarded by self-interested trust (forward looking
in the expectation of continuing business) and socially
oriented trust (backward looking, based on a history of
working relationships). The attitudes of the contracting parties
and the cooperative relationships among the project
participants are important for the facilitation of joint risk
management – a concept underpinned by relational
contracting (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002).
2.2. Clarity of roles and functions of project participants
Trusting and cooperative relationships are perceived as
fundamental elements in relational contracting/partnering
arrangements although Liu and Fellows (2009) find that there
are no differences between trust levels in partnering and non-
partnering projects. Partnering and framework arrangements
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are underpinned by a strong need for relationship
management among the stakeholders. Smyth (2008) cautions
that stakeholder management theory needs to recognise
responsibilities for ethical care (i.e. interests of internal and
external stakeholders) which means that construction projects
should transform from relational contracting to relationship
management to benefit all the players not just the powerful
ones.
Relationship building depends on role clarity and trusting
behaviours. Jin and Ling (2005) conclude that: (a)
relationships transform from shallow dependence to deep
interdependence over time; (b) different relationships bring
about distinct inherent risks; and (c) different trust-fostering
tools counterbalance specific inherent risks. Trusting
behaviours cannot be nurtured if participants doubt respective
roles and responsibilities. The dynamics capabilities
framework (Teece et al., 1997) advocates that competitive
advantage primarily depends on managerial and
organisational processes. Managerial and organisational
processes are categorised into: (a) coordination/integration;
(b) learning; and (c) reconfiguration/transformation (see Green
et al., 2008). The clarity of roles and functions of the project
participants in a contract helps to foster relationship building
and, arguably, dispute resolution.
2.3. Payment operating mechanisms
Disputes are argued by some to be inevitable but should be
avoided as they are time consuming, expensive and
unpleasant. Even if a dispute cannot be avoided, it should be
resolved as efficiently as possible. Payment terms and
mechanisms are particular issues of concern and a great
source of disputes in contracts (Gould et al., 1999; Watts and
Scrivener, 1992). The causes of payment problems have been
identified as relating to hierarchical/contractual relationships,
deficiency of the credit system, deficiency of the legal system
and available remedies, sully/demand imbalance, unfair
contract terms, loose implementation of existing laws and
starting projects without sufficient funding arrangements (Wu
et al., 2008). Construction industry reports worldwide have
advocated payment protection laws (Latham, 1993; NSWDC,
2004; WALRC, 1998). Examples of responses to payment
protection include the Housing Grants, Construction and
Regeneration Act 1996 and the ‘Fair Payment Charter’ (OGC,
2007) in the UK and the Security of Payment Act in
Singapore which became law in 2005 which guarantees
contractors payment for work done (BCA, 2005). Clear
payment operating mechanisms that are readily understood
would help to foster a collaborative climate in projects.
Hence, the three pillars underpin the requirements of a
modern construction contract: ‘fairness’, ‘roles and functions
of project participants’ and ‘payment operating mechanisms’.
3. NEC3 – A MODERN CONTRACT?
A historical context on calls for the UK construction industry
to develop contracting practices that align with the three
pillars outlined above is important in placing the discussion
on the NEC3 (ICE, 2005) as a modern contract in perspective
(see Murray and Langford, 2003 for a more comprehensive
review). Almost half a century ago, Emmerson (1962) pointed
out the lack of cohesion between all parties to a construction
contract and mulled over ‘the possibility of adopting a
common form of contract for both civil and building
engineering work’. Further suggestions were made that the
standardisation should also apply to subcontracts (Emmerson,
1962).
Banwell (1964) subsequently argued that the most urgent
problem with the construction industry was the ‘necessity of
thinking and acting as a whole’. Attitudes and procedures
needed to change but such change was ‘of no avail until
those engaged in the industry themselves think and act
together’ (Banwell, 1964). The changes proposed included
steps to ‘agree a joint form for building and civil engineering
conditions of contract’ and a unification of subcontract terms
and conditions (Banwell, 1964).
Concern was expressed at the proliferation of standard forms
and endeavours were made ‘to define what a modern
construction contract ought to contain’ with 13 requirements
set out for a most effective form of contract – a Modern
Contract (Latham, 1994). The first edition of the New
Engineering Contract (ICE, 1993) is recognised as ‘containing
virtually all these assumptions of best practice’ (Latham,
1994) although a further seven specific adjustments were
recommended for full compliance.
Key drivers for change including integrated processes and
teams were later identified (Egan, 1998). Substantial changes to
the culture and structure of UK construction were thought to
enable improvement in the relationships between companies.
Egan (1998) acknowledged that collaboration is required from
both the legal profession and contract writing bodies in order
to prevent an adversarial approach. Reporting a few years later
on progress, Egan (2002) alluded to the UK Office of
Government Commerce’s recommendation of the adoption of
forms of contract that encourage project team integration.
The requirements for a modern construction contract (Latham,
1994) are intended to meet the expectations and needs of the
contracting parties in modern construction procurement. The
fundamental problem to be addressed is the long-established
and well-documented adversarial relationships. The suggested
solution is an attitudinal change towards a collaborative
climate, fostering roles of clarity and fairness in upholding
contractual obligations, especially prompt payment and
dispute resolution through (primarily) managerial skills. NEC3
is the complete integrated set of the latest editions of the
various NEC contracts. Although other standard forms of
contract are still in use in the UK, NEC3 has taken into
account (to various extents) the requirements of a modern
contract in terms of ‘fairness’, ‘roles and functions of project
participants’, and ‘payment operating mechanisms’. Indeed,
the three fundamental principles underpinning the drafting of
the NEC contracts (i.e. clarity and simplicity; flexibility of use;
and stimulus to good management) ensured consistency of the
contract provisions with the requirements of a modern
contract. The specific provisions within the NEC3 that meet
the three pillars are examined in detailed below.
3.1. Fairness
The NEC3 provides a number of core clauses that address the
issue of fairness (see Appendix). There were specific
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alterations to the NEC3 to take account of four requirements
relating to fairness, namely (a) duty of fair dealing with all
parties, (b) teamwork to achieve win–win solutions, (c) risk
allocation, and (d) trust funds.
The duty of fair dealing refers to ‘A specific duty for all
parties to deal fairly with each other, and with their
subcontractors, specialists and suppliers, in an atmosphere of
mutual co-operation’ (Latham, 1994). Specific changes to
include this duty are also recommended to clause 1 and to the
subcontract (ICE, 1993). It was also recommended that none
of the core clauses be amended by either party to the contract
(Latham, 1994).
NEC2 ECC clause 10.1 (together with clause 10.1 of NEC2
Engineering and Construction Subcontract) has been amended
to include an obligation to act ‘in a spirit of mutual trust and
co-operation’ (ICE, 1995).
In the absence of a proposal to use an NEC form of contract
with its subcontractors, the contractor is required to submit
each of the proposed conditions of contract to the project
manager for acceptance (see ECC clause 26.3; ICE, 2005). The
project manager can use the absence of a statement that the
parties to the subcontract shall ‘act in a spirit of mutual trust
and co-operation’ as a reason for non-acceptance (ECC clause
26.3; ICE, 2005). Thus, it cannot be demonstrated that the
NEC3 provides true compliance with the specific
recommendation by Latham (1994) that subcontracting on an
NEC form ‘be a mandatory condition’ in contracts.
There are no provisions preventing the parties from amending
any of the core clauses. In essence, amending the contract
should not be difficult to achieve as the parties remain
(largely) free to negotiate the final contract terms.
To achieve win–win solutions through teamwork, Latham
(1994) suggests that ‘Firm duties, with shared financial
motivation to pursue those objectives be set. These should
involve a general presumption to achieve ‘win–win’ solutions
to problems which may arise during the course of the project’.
Specific recommendations were made for clause 16.3 to be
strengthened to give effect to the principle of devising
solutions in a spirit of partnership.
The introduction of a risk register (ECC clause 11.2; ICE, 2005),
comprising a list of the risks set out in the contract data and
those which have been notified during the currency of the
contract as an early warning matter, assists the parties to share
in problem solving. This register is reviewed at risk reduction
meetings where, among others, the parties who attend
cooperate in ‘seeking solutions that will bring advantage to all
those who will be affected’ (ECC clause 16.3; ICE, 2005).
The risk allocation requirement emphasises ‘A choice of
allocation of risks, to be decided as appropriate to each
project but then allocated to the party best able to manage,
estimate and carry the risk.’ (Latham, 1994). The allocation of
general, legal and insurable risks to the employer are set out
under six main categories (see clause 80.1; ICE, 2005), those
risks not allocated to the employer being carried by the
contractor (ICE, 2005).
Financial risks are allocated, as appropriate, by the use of the
main option clauses and by compensation events. The
contractor carries the financial risk of doing work he has
priced under Options A and B with the employer carrying the
financial risk for additional works instructed under those
options. Where a target price is used under options C or D the
financial risks, on or around the target set, can be shared, up
to a point, using share arrangements.
Lastly, ‘Providing for secure trust fund routes of payment’ is a
specific recommendation for the NEC contract which suggests
secure trust funds should be included ‘as a Core Clause . . .
into which the client deposits payments’ with the perceived
benefits of providing greater confidence for contractors and
subcontractors (Latham, 1994).
A trust fund could be set up (see option clause V; ICE, 1995)
with sample documentation included in the Guidance Notes
(ICE, 1995). The trust fund option is however not included in
NEC3 (ICE, 2005). Following implementation of the ‘Fair
Payment Charter’ (OGC, 2007) a project bank account could
be created to facilitate direct payment to other members of
the project team (see option Z; ICE, 2008).
3.2. Roles and functions of project participants
The NEC3 addresses the roles and functions of project
participants through: (a) integrated package of documents, (b)
simple language and guidance notes, (c) role separation, and
(d) speedy dispute resolution.
The integrated package of documents ‘clearly defines the roles
and duties of all involved, and which is suitable for all types
of project and for any procurement route’ (Latham, 1994).
Different types of project and procurement routes are catered
for. In addition to providing the works, the employer states
which parts of the works the contractor is to design (see ECC
clause 21.1; ICE, 2005). Further flexibility is introduced by
selecting one of six main (pricing) options.
Latham (1994) also recommended alterations to the NEC to
include a full matrix of consultants’ and adjudicators’ terms
of appointment interlocked with the main contract. Latham
(1994) further suggested that standard tender documents and
bonds are desirable.
The NEC was amended soon after the Latham report to
include: Professional Services Contract (ICE, 1995) for
consultants; Engineering and Construction Subcontract (ICE,
1995) for subcontractors; and the Adjudicator’s Contract (ICE,
1995) for an adjudicator (ICE, 2005). The NEC3 family also
includes a short form of subcontract, term services contract
and a framework agreement.
A sample form of tender and form of agreement are included
in the Guidance Notes (ICE, 2005). Sample forms of bonds or
guarantees are, however, not included.
The use of simple language and guidance notes can enhance
role clarity, hence the NEC3 comprises ‘Easily
comprehensible language and with Guidance Notes attached’
(Latham, 1994). Guidance notes and flowcharts are available
for the majority of documents in the NEC3 family. One of
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the original drafting aims of the NEC contract was that it
should be in ordinary language thereby being a model of
‘clarity and simplicity’ (ICE, 1993) and therefore readily
understood by those who are not used to formal contracts or
whose first language is not English. The use of ordinary
language was also envisaged to make it easier to translate
into other languages (ICE, 2005). Some elements of NEC2
have been translated into Chinese with consideration given
to do so with NEC3.
More specifically, the emphasis is on the ‘Separation of the
roles of contract administrator, project or lead manager and
adjudicator. The project or lead manager should be clearly
defined as client’s representative.’ (Latham, 1994). The roles
of the project manager and the adjudicator are clearly
separated. The project manager is appointed by the employer
(ICE, 2005) and, being the principal point of contact with the
contractor, is able to give instructions, acceptances and issue
certificates. He also assesses amounts due for work done to
date and compensation events (ICE, 2005). Eggleston (2006)
notes that the project manager has no more than an implied
requirement to act impartially and only as a certifier, citing
the English case of Costain Ltd and Others v. Bechtel Ltd
2005.
Lastly, the requirement for speedy dispute resolution was
stated as ‘While taking all possible steps to avoid conflict on
site, providing for speedy dispute resolution if any conflict
arises, by a pre-determined impartial adjudicator/referee/
expert.’ (Latham, 1994). Procedures to avoid conflict have
been included by the introduction of early warning notices, a
risk register and risk reduction meetings. Parties attend the
risk reduction meetings with specific aims to avoid or reduce
risks and to seek solutions to the advantage of all affected
(ICE, 2005).
If any disputes arise, the contract provides a mechanism for
independent adjudication. The adjudicator can be named in
the contract data and has jurisdiction to resolve disputes
(including any action of the project manager) with the
timetable for a decision from the adjudicator normally within
4 weeks (ICE, 2005).
3.3. Payment operating mechanisms
Many disputes arise out of payment issues. Clear operating
mechanisms for payment are therefore of paramount
importance. The NEC3 addresses this by taking into account
five of Latham’s (1994) recommendations, namely (a)
variations, (b) mechanisms for assessing interim payments, (c)
payment period, (d) incentives, and (e) advanced mobilisation.
Variations often occur with a ‘cost’ consequence, so one
should take ‘all reasonable steps to avoid changes to pre-
planned works information. But, where variations do occur,
they should be priced in advance, with provision for
independent adjudication if agreement cannot be reached.’
(Latham, 1994). NEC3 envisages the works information to be
as complete as possible. Nevertheless, changes to the works
information are envisaged (see ECC clause 60.1; ICE, 2005).
NEC3 also provides for quotations to be submitted and
approved before implantation of any changes (see ECC clause
61.2; ICE, 2005). Any event giving rise to additional cost and/
or extension of time is identified as a compensation event
(see ECC Section 6; ICE, 2005).
Latham (1994) recommended: ‘Express provision for assessing
interim payments by methods other than monthly valuation –
milestones, activity schedules or payment schedules. Such
arrangements must also be reflected in the related subcontract
documentation. The eventual aim should be to phase out the
traditional system of monthly measurement or re-
measurement but meanwhile provision should still be made
for it.’
NEC3 acknowledges various forms of interim payments. The
process for interim payments is initiated by the project
manager assessing the price for work done to date and other
sums, namely the amount due at each assessment date with
the period between assessments being governed by the
‘assessment interval’ (see ECC clause 50.1; ICE, 2005).
Activity schedules under option A are to be used as a
payment schedule. In addition, activities could be grouped
together to invoke payment by milestones.
NEC3 addresses the importance of ‘Clearly setting out the
period within which interim payments must be made to all
participants in the process, failing which they will have an
automatic right to compensation, involving payment of
interest at a sufficiently heavy rate to deter slow payment.’
(Latham, 1994). The timetable for payments proceeds from the
assessment process (see clause 50; ICE, 2005). Payment from
the employer is expected to be within 3 weeks of the
assessment date and, if late, attract compound interest at a
pre-agreed rate (ICE, 2005).
A modern contract should also provide ‘incentives for
exceptional performance’ (Latham, 1994). The use of target
pricing under main options C and D (ICE, 2005) is designed to
encourage good performance and, provided the pain/gain
share is appropriate, could provide incentives for exceptional
performance. Further incentives may be implemented by the
use of key performance indicators (KPIs) whether as part of
partnering option X12 (ICE, 2005) or by use of secondary
option X20 and a pre-agreed incentive schedule (ICE, 2005).
Bonuses can also be won for early completion of the works
(see secondary option X6; ICE, 2005).
NEC3 allows the parties to make ‘provision where appropriate
for advance mobilisation payments (if necessary, bonded) to
contractors and subcontractors, including in respect of offsite
prefabricated materials provided by part of the construction
team’ (Latham, 1994). The employer can agree to make an
advanced payment (for any purpose) which is then repaid in
an agreed way from assessed amounts (see option X14; ICE,
2005).
Apart from the specific provisions within the NEC3
highlighted above which enabled it to meet the three pillars
of a modern contract, the NEC3 structure as a family of
contracts is one of its greatest strengths. This idea of a
contract-suite provides flexibility in the use of the NEC3 and
allows for choices of a contract type to be made, based on the
dynamics of various contingency variables. The NEC3 family
of contracts typically provides contracts along the
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transactional–relational continuum of contracts with selection
of which option to use based on specific project, client and
external circumstances.
4. DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACT PRACTICES IN
CHINA AND UK
Before the 1990s, China began to introduce a free market
economy to the previously ‘planned economy’. The formal
relationships between the contracting parties in such a ‘mixed
economy’ was still largely governed by the ‘administration
relationship’. The parties looked to their ‘working relationship’
and not to the contract. For the Yifang (construction
enterprises/contractor), the motivation to become efficient
and/or to turn a profit was hindered by the fact that losses
were reimbursed by and profit was returned to the
government or Jiafang (the project investor/employer).
The contract eventually signed by two Chinese parties could
be only a few pages or even limited to a single page which
was simply put aside or locked in a safe throughout and after
execution. Over time, effected by further economic reform
and open policy, the planned economy gave way to a market
economy and the construction enterprises began to find
themselves having to act as businesses with financial
responsibility for themselves.
In the face of ‘globalisation’ and pressures to adopt
international practices, the formalisation of contractual
relationships in the Chinese construction market began in the
1980s. Various versions of the model (standard form)
construction contract were prepared, for example in 1991,
1999, 2003 and 2007. The 2003 version was prepared as a
result of further regulatory change including the introduction
of the Contract Law in 1999 and the Bidding Law in 2000.
The 2007 version was introduced subsequent to a meeting of
the drafting committee held in July 2005 in Beijing
coordinated by the China National Association of Engineering
Consultants (CNAEC). Although no formal notes were
prepared from the meeting, it was agreed to adopt the FIDIC
(International Federation of Consulting Engineers: http://
www1.fidic.org/bookshop/default_contracts.asp) 1999
contract as the basic reference framework. As a result of the
combined efforts of the individuals and organisations on the
drafting committee, a new model construction contract (‘the
2007 version’) drawing on Fidic 1999 was released officially
in the joint names of ministries, commission and
administrations involved. Both structure and content changed
with the 2007 version comprising three parts: general
contract conditions; particular contract conditions; and the
appendices. Within the general conditions were a number of
clauses largely following the format of the Fidic 1999
contract clauses.
Ironically, while the UK construction industry has been
emphasising ‘cooperative relationships’ over formal
constraints of contractual rights (e.g. to whom does the blame
lie), the Chinese construction industry has been moving from
an unspoken set of behavioural (cooperative) rules which
govern individuals’ actions in a hierarchically complex
manner to a more explicit set of formal rules as spelled out in
FIDIC. To paraphrase Hewitt and Bovaird (1996) in their
earlier reference to contracting practices in public and private
sectors: ‘It . . . almost appears that the two [industries] have
passed each other in the night, one [China] seeking the ‘old
testament’ paradise of salvation by market competition, the
other [UK] seeking the ‘new testament’ Holy Grail of salvation
by collaboration, with the irony that each is seeking
desperately what the other has only recently given up.’
Arguably, people’s behaviours do not change in an instant
(especially not social and cultural norms) and, thus, the Chinese
can be expected to continually operate in their collectivistic
manner within a more formal contractual setting (such as
Fidic). In fact, Herbig and Martin (1998) report that ‘the Chinese
generally insist that a ‘‘friendly negotiations clause’’ be put into
the contract which obligates the parties to make a good faith
effort to resolve any differences before they enter formal
arbitration’. Whereas Fidic provides a framework that the
Chinese could appreciate (since the cooperative values and
implied rules for behaviours are already embedded in Chinese
society), the NEC3 may not be able to demonstrate immediate
(appealing) advantages over the traditional contracts (since the
Chinese may not see the need to emphasise relationships).
Furthermore, Fidic has been well tried and tested within the
Chinese construction industry with many reported successes
(He, 2004; Lu and Wang, 2004), thus, its increasing adoption is
a consequence of its track record. NEC has no such comparable
record as yet and the Chinese government will be reluctant to
issue any guidelines on its adoption until there is proven record
of success.
Although the Chinese may seem to embrace traditional
contracts, their approach is still different from the western
approach to traditional contracts. The differences manifest in
how Chinese managers emphasise the ‘context’ rather than
the ‘content’ when they negotiate formal contracts. As Pitta
et al. (1999) point out ‘if a sticky detail comes up, Chinese
managers feel that communication and relationships will
solve it’. There is less concern about meeting contract
conditions, since the contract is viewed as a symbol of the
relationships among partners. It is reported for example how
‘some Chinese managers were irate to learn that their
American partners had no intention of modifying an
agreement after signing’ (Pitta et al., 1999).
However, the flexibility provided in the NEC3 family through
its many options and contract forms may lead to its increased
use in international contracts. It is likely that oriental
societies such as China will gladly engage in the use of NEC3
in the future as it encompasses a cooperative rationale
consistent with their culture while also still containing some
transactional contracting features that appeal to such
societies (i.e. the idea of a transactional–relational continuum
embedded in NEC3).
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper reviewed the latest edition of the Engineering and
Construction Contract (ICE, 2005) against the Latham
requirements for a modern contract. It is evident that the NEC
family is almost fully compliant with the principles of
Latham’s modern contract interpreted here as comprising
three pillars: fairness, roles and functions of project
participants, and payment operating mechanisms (Barnes,
1996; Latham, 1994). The aim in future research is to further
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the debate of whether the NEC3 family, with its compliance
with these principles, could be of use in developing
relationships and furthering project management
performance. This is particularly relevant in the light of the
variety of problems resulting from the limitations of
traditional project delivery systems in construction including
the inappropriate allocation of risk and reward under those
systems.
In recent years, researchers and practitioners have drawn on
international lessons in construction procurement,
subsequently pointing out the relevance of partnering and
cooperation. Preliminary studies have suggested that
relational contracting (the NEC3 family being one of the
standard forms used in this field of contracting) could be
effective provided appropriate countermeasures are adopted
to eliminate obstacles to such form of contracting.
Nevertheless, further research is required to analyse the legal
and cultural framework of the construction markets in
oriental and western societies in order to identify: (a)
whether Latham’s requirements for a modern contract as
outlined here are appropriate, in particular, for multinational
projects; and (b) any shortfalls in NEC3, with
recommendations for amendments, to promote relational
contracting principles.
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